

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN 3379

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: UNGA KS KN CH NZ

SUBJ: KOREA AT 29TH UNGA: PRC COUNSELOR'S COMMENTS TO NZ REP

FOLLOWING IS REPORT OF SEPTEMBER 20 CONVERSATION BETWEEN
NEW ZEALAND DEPUTYPERMREP MANSFIELD AND PRC COUNSELLOR
CHOU NAN RELATING TO HANDLING OF KOREAN ISSUE AT 29TH
UNGA WHICH MANSFIELD HAS PASSED US ON STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
BASIS.

QUOTE:

ON FRIDAY 20 SEPTEMBER, SHORTLY AFTER THE GENERAL
COMMITTEE VOTE IN FAVOUR OF MERGING THE TWO KOREAN ITEMS,
THE CHINESE COUNSELLOR, CHOU NAN, TOOK ME ASIDE TO TALK
ABOUT THE KOREAN QUESTION.

2. HE ASKED ME WHAT I THOUGHT WOULD HAPPEN NOW. I SAID
THAT IT WAS TO BE HOPED THAT WE WOULD HAVE A BALANCED
AND NON-POLEMICAL DEBATE WHICH WOULD LEAD TO SOME CONSENSUS,
AS HAD BEEN ACHIEVED LAST YEAR. CHOU NAN SAID HE HOPED
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SO TOO BUT IF A COMPROMISE WAS NOT REACHED CHINA WOULD BE

QUITE HAPPY TO SEE THE TWO RESOLUTIONS BROUGHT TO A VOTE:
EVEN IF THEIR SIDE LOST THEY WOULD HAVE MADE "A STAND FOR
AN IMPORTANT PRINCIPLE" AND "ALL THE WORLD WOULD KNOW"
WHERE OTHER COUNTRIES STOOD.

3. CHOU NAN ASKED WHAT I THOUGHT OF THEIR RESOLUTION. I
SAID THAT, SEPARATELY PERSONALLY, IT WAS NOT TOO BAD AT ALL:
THE REFERENCES TO INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF
KOREA BY FOREIGN TROOPS UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
HOWEVER WERE UNFORTUNATE, INDEED THEY WERE FACTUALLY INCORRECT.
CHOU NAN REPLIED THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO NEGOTIATE
FOR THE REMOVAL OF SUCH REFERENCES IF IT WOULD ASSIST
GENERAL AGREEMENT.

4. WHEN I SOUGHT HIS OPINION ON OUR RESOLUTION HE SAID WITH
EMPHASIS THAT THE SECOND OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH WAS "COMPLETELY
UNACCEPTABLE" TO CHINA BECAUSE OF THE REFERENCE TO THE
SECURITY COUNCIL. I EXPLAINED THAT THE RESOLUTION HAD
BEEN DRAFTED WITH CONSIDERABLE CARE TO MAKE IT AS NON-
CONTROVERSIAL AS POSSIBLE. THERE WAS NO WISH TO EMBARRASS
CHINA BUT SURELY IT WAS INESCAPABLE THAT WHAT THE SECURITY
COUNCIL HAD STARTED ONLY IT COULD FINISH? THERE HAD BEEN A
RESOLUTION OF THE COUNCIL ESTABLISHING THE UNITED NATIONS
COMMAND AND WHILE THE DISSOLUTION OF THE COMMAND COULD BE
NEGOTIATED OUTSIDE THE COUNCIL, AT SOME STAGE THE COUNCIL
SURELY WOULD HAVE TO TAKE SOME PRO FORMA ACTION.

5. CHOU NAN DISAGREED STRONGLY ARGUING THAT IT WOULD BE
SUFFICIENT FOR THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO MAKE A DECISION.
I POINTED OUT THAT CONSTITUTIONALLY THE ASSEMBLY COULD
MAKE ONLY A RECOMMENDATION ON THE MATTER AND THAT THE
DECISION LAY WITH THE COUNCIL. BUT INVOLVEMENT OF THE
COUNCIL, CHOU REPEATED WAS "UNACCEPTABLE". I REPLIED THAT
GIVEN THE WILL TO REACH AN AGREEMENT IT SHOULD NOT BE
BEYOND THE WIT OF MAN TO FIND A WAY WHICH WOULD TAKE ACCOUNT OF
CHINA'S SENSITIVITIES, WHICH WERE FULLY UNDERSTOOD.
THE COUNCIL'S INVOLVEMENT COULD BE MINIMAL AND COULD BE
STAGED ACCORDINGLY. FOR EXAMPLE, TO AVOID A VOTE THERE COULD
BE A CONSENSUS STATEMENT; OR IF THERE WERE A VOTE CHINA
NEED NOT PARTICIPATE IN IT; OR CHINA COULD EVEN ABSENT
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ITSELF FROM THE MEETING (ALTHOUGH THE LATTER COULD PRESENT
THE SOVIET WITH A PROBLEM).

6. WE HAD SOME DISCUSSION OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. I
SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN THE AGREEMENT AND HOPED
THIS WAS ACCEPTED. CHOU NAN DID NOT DISSENT BUT HE ENQUIRED
HOW THIS WAS TO BE DONE. THIS AGAIN I SUGGESTED WAS A
MATTER FOR CAREFUL NEGOTIATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES CONCERNED.

I UNDERSTOOD THERE WERE A NUMBER OF POSSIBILITIES: ONE WAS THAT THE COMMANDER OF THE U.S. FORCES IN KOREA AND THE COMMANDER OF THE ROK FORCES MIGHT SIGN IN PLACE OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND. CHOU NAN LOOKED DOUBTFUL: WHY SHOULD THERE BE ANY ROLE FOR UNITED STATES FORCES? IT WAS THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN TROOPS WHICH WAS HINDERING THE PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF THE COUNTRY - THAT WAS THE ROOT OF THE PROBLEM. THERE WERE NO FOREIGN TROOPS IN NORTH KOREA SO THERE SHOULD BE NONE IN THE SOUTH.

7. I SAID I COULD NOT AGREE. IT WAS DIFFICULT TO EQUATE WITHDRAWAL FROM THE NORTH WITH THE SOUTH BECAUSE ONE INVOLVED DEPARTURE TO A POINT CLOSE AT HAND, THE OTHER TO A FAR AWAY PLACE. IN ANY EVENT A DECISION TO INVITE FOREIGN TROOPS ONTO ITS SOIL WAS A MATTER FOR SOVEREIGN DECISION BY ANY COUNTRY. SOME WANTED THEM, SOME DIDN'T. SURELY HE (CHOU NAN) WOULD NOT DENY THAT THIS RIGHT EXISTED? THE FRG TO TAKE BUT ONE EXAMPLE HAD UNITED STATES TROOPS ON ITS SOIL AND I UNDERSTOOD THAT CHINA DID NOT OBJECT TO THIS. CHOU NAN LAUGHED SAYING THAT THAT WAS "A COMPLETELY DIFFERENT MATTER". ONE NEEDED "TO LOOK AT THE REALITIES" ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA.

8. I QUERIED WHETHER IN ANY EVENT THE PRESENCE OF UNITED STATES FORCES IN THE ROK UNDER A BILATERAL TREATY WAS REALLY A MATTER OF GREAT CONCERN. CHINA KNEW, AS EVERYONE KNEW, THAT THE UNITED STATES PRESENCE ON THE ASIAN MAINLAND (AS ON TAIWAN) WOULD BE PROGRESSIVELY REDUCED AS TENSION IN THE AREA DIMINISHED. IT WASN'T REALLY POSSIBLE TO FORCE THE PACE IN A MATTER LIKE THIS. CHOU NAN MADE NO COMMENT. (KNOWING HIM I THINK HE MOST CERTAINLY WOULD HAVE DONE SO HAD HE DISAGREED.)

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9. FROM THIS CONVERSATION WITH CHOU NAN I RECEIVED THREE

PRINCIPAL IMPRESSIONS:

(A) THAT THE CHINESE WERE DEFINITELY INTERESTED IN NEGOTIATING A COMPROMISE;

(B) THAT THE PRESENCE OF U.S. FORCESS AS OPPOSED TO UNITED NATIONS COMMAND, FLAG, ETC. - WOULD NOT BE A STICKING POINT IN ANY NEGOTIATION; BUT

(C) THAT THE CHINESE FEEL VERY STRONGLY INDEED ABOUT THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN THE EXERCISE AND THAT THIS COULD BE ONE OF THE MOST DIFFICULT ISSUES TO RESOLVE. UNQUOTE SCALI

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